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Meeting the Enemy
British-German Encounters in the Occupied Rhineland after the First
World War
Tom Williams
1 Negative stereotypes of the German enemy were so pervasive in Britain during the First
World War that, when crossing into German territory at the end of the conflict, the
writer and social reformer Violet Markham remarked that it was “almost with a shock
that you realise that German civilians are not equipped with hoofs and horns or other
attributes of a Satanic character” (Markham 1921: 15). Visions of a brutal, arrogant,
warmongering “Hun”, disseminated since 1914 in British propaganda as a means of
justifying wartime mobilization and sacrifice, proved difficult to sustain once British
soldiers and civilians met individual Germans face-to-face in the occupied Rhineland.
However effective they may be as a propaganda tool for galvanising public opinion in
wartime,  enemy  images  inevitably  require  a  process  of  psychological  abstraction,
relying on a  set  of  beliefs  and assumptions  that  often bear  little  relation to  socio-
historical realities or individual experiences (Rieber & Kelly 1991; Oppenheimer 2006).
It should be no surprise, therefore, that individual encounters on the Rhine proved far
more complex and often more troubling than the black-and-white propaganda images
of wartime. As Violet Markham reflected, it was “easy to hate the abstraction called
Germany, but for individual Germans one feels either like, dislike, or indifference, the
same as for other people” (Markham 1921: 88).
2 Markham was far from alone in making such an observation. As many other British
writers, journalists, soldiers and administrators in the Rhineland observed, day-to-day
encounters with an often disconcertingly friendly civilian population tended to break
down the negative wartime stereotypes (Williamson 1991: 5). Proximity bred sympathy,
and  phrases  such  as  “yesterday’s  enemy”  or  “our  former  enemy”  quickly  became
commonplace in British accounts, embodying a mood of reconciliation in the Occupied
Rhineland that was at odds with the Germanophobia of the British public and press
(Wittek 2005: 393).  As one British observer in Germany put it  in August 1919 when
trying to explain attitudes in the Rhineland to readers at home: “we don’t have your
perspective. Living as close to him as we do, we lose sight of that indefinite, loathly,
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blood-dripping horror called ‘the Boche’” (The Bystander, 20 Aug. 1919). However, it was
not easy for British occupiers and observers in Germany to abandon this enemy image
entirely,  not  least  because  negative  characterizations  of  Prussian  militarism  and
German  brutality  had  played  an  important  role  in  justifying  not  only  British
involvement in the war but also the punitive conditions of the peace. In the context of
this post-war occupation certain specific features of the wartime enemy image were
therefore  sustained  and  reinforced.  To  some  British  observers,  for  example,  the
friendliness of the Rhineland population only served to confirm the servile disposition
of  the  Germans  towards  any  authority,  or  the  existence  of  a  division  in  Germany
between a liberal, peace-loving and civilized south and west and the “real” enemy: an
autocratic, militarist and expansionist Prussia. Meanwhile, the attitude and behaviour
of the British occupiers was regularly measured not only against how the Germans had
treated the populations of occupied regions of France and Belgium during the war, but
also against how the stereotypical “Hun” would have behaved in the case of a German
victory. Despite the initial shock of encountering friendly German civilians, aspects of
the enemy image thus persisted throughout the occupation years, albeit in less overt
ways than in wartime propaganda.
3 This  article  examines  how  the  encounter  between  the  British  occupiers  and  the
Rhineland population both modified and, in more subtle ways, perpetuated wartime
images of the German enemy. In order to do so, it first situates the image of the German
enemy in British propaganda during the First World War within the wider context of
shifting,  and  often  positive,  British  views  of  Germany  since  the  late  19th century.
Although it is impossible to offer a detailed analysis of pre-war and wartime views of
Germany within the scope of this article, it is nevertheless helpful to sketch out this
broader context in order to underline both the complexity of British views of Germany
before 1918 and the (contested) continued relevance of negative stereotypes after the
defeat of the German Empire in November 1918. Secondly, by examining a wide range
of first-hand accounts written by British occupiers,  journalists and travellers in the
occupied Rhineland it reveals how the encounter with the occupied population altered
British attitudes towards Germany while  still  allowing certain negative stereotypes,
particularly relating to Prussia, to be perpetuated. Finally, drawing on the same eye-
witness  accounts,  it  explores  how  the  self-image  of  the  British  occupiers  in  the
Rhineland was constructed not only in opposition to the enemy image of the German
occupier, perpetuating pre-existing suppositions and negative stereotypes, but also in
opposition to the actions of the French on the Rhine which, conversely, gave rise to a
more positive, sympathetic view of the Germans. Although several of the eye-witness
accounts examined in this article were written by journalists, it does not seek to assess
the impact on British public opinion of images of Germany promulgated by the mass
media, a subject which has been dealt with in meticulous detail elsewhere (Schramm
2007; Wittek 2005). Instead, by concentrating on first-hand accounts written by British
occupiers and observers who spent a significant amount of time in the Rhineland, it
seeks  to  assess  how,  on  an  individual  level,  face-to-face  encounters  with  German
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The Enemy Image during the First World War: Origins,
Functions, Tensions 
4 When war broke out in August 1914, the image of a brutal, barbaric and militaristic
German (or Prussian) enemy would already have been familiar to much of the British
public.  Evidence of such negative stereotypes can be found in British discussions of
Germany since the 1860s, when military victories over Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866
and France in 1870 paved the way towards the foundation of the German Empire under
Prussian  leadership.  To cite  just  one  example,  Lord  Arthur  Russell  characterized
Prussia  in  1872  as  the  antithesis  of  “liberal  and  democratic  ideas”,  listing  among
Prussian traits “military despotism, the rule of the sword, contempt for sentimental
talk,  [and]  indifference  to  human suffering”  (Wittek  2005:  79).  As  the  new German
Empire grew into an industrial and technological powerhouse, and began to challenge
Britain’s  maritime  dominance  after  the  first  German Naval  Laws  of  1898,  concerns
regarding British deficiencies tended to be reflected in those characteristics attributed
to Germany: technocracy, ruthless efficiency, militarism and illiberalism (Rau 2009: 2-4;
Scully 2012: 316-7; Rüger 2007).  As tensions between the two countries were stoked
further by the actions of Kaiser Wilhelm II — most famously by the Kruger Telegram of
1896, in which he congratulated the Boers for repelling the Jameson Raid, and the Daily
Telegraph Affair of 1908, in which he was quoted as referring to the British as “mad as
March hares” — negative images in the British press, presenting the German Empire as
power-hungry,  unpredictable  and  a  threat  to  international  stability,  became
increasingly bound up with the portrayal of the Emperor himself (Reinermann 2008).
By the time of the Entente Cordiale in 1904, Germany had replaced France as Britain’s
most  likely  potential  conqueror  in  popular  “invasion  literature”,  including  Erskine
Childers’ The Riddle of the Sands (1903), William Le Queux’s The Invasion of 1910 (1906) and
Saki’s When William Came (1913) (Rau 2009: 65-88). On the eve of the First World War,
popular  Germanophobia  in  Britain  even  extended  to  hostility  towards  the  sale  of
German sausages in Britain (Waddington 2013).
5 Despite  much uncertainty  as  to  how Germany’s  rising  power  would  affect  Britain’s
position in the world, however, it would be far too simplistic to claim, as one recent
study of pre-war Anglo-German relations has done, that by the late 1890s “an entire
generation of Britons and Germans […] had come to age having imbibed a consistent,
and consistently negative, view of each other” (Hawes 2014: 404). For much of the 19th
century, the German Empire had been widely admired in Britain for achievements in
fields  as  varied  as  music  and  literature,  philosophy  and  education,  science  and
technology, and social  welfare reform (Davis 2007; Geppert & Gerwarth 2008; Major
2008). The Rhine remained popular with British travellers, while German universities
continued to  attract  ambitious  British  students  (Schulz-Forberg  2002:  101-2).  There
were just as many positive depictions of Germany in pre-war English literature as there
were Germanophobic invasion stories (Argyle 2002; Rau 2009). Even on the eve of the
First  World  War,  British  views  of  Germany  were  complex  and  multifaceted,
characterized not only by antagonism but also by a great deal of admiration, as well as
ambivalence (Scully 2012: 316). The British and the Germans had never previously gone
to  war  against  each other  and could  look  back  on a  long  tradition  of  political  co-
operation, as well as strong dynastic, cultural, religious and economic ties (Kennedy
1980: xi).  A study of students in Oxford and Heidelberg has found that, rather than
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German and British  elites  drifting  apart  in  the  pre-war  years,  “life  was  slowly  but
steadily moving in the right direction” (Weber 2008: 223). Thus, even if negative images
of  Germany were  present  in  British  culture  before  1914,  the  wide  range  of  British
attitudes towards Germany and the Germans cannot be summed up simply in terms of
an “enemy image”.
6 Once  war  broke  out,  however,  pre-existing  negative  images  of  Prussian/German
autocracy,  militarism  and  brutality  were  readily  taken  up  by  British  propaganda
(Wittek  2005:  82).  After  the  German  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  Britain  was
presented  as  having  reluctantly  taken  up  arms  to  defend  high  moral  and  legal
principles against “Prussian bullying” and a German state bent on world domination
(Welch  2015).  As  Adrian  Gregory  has  observed,  “every  step  on  the  way  to  the
demonization of Germany was prompted by real events, albeit events interpreted in a
highly partisan framework” (Gregory 2008: 40). Reports of German atrocities against
Belgian and French civilians during the first weeks of the war were presented in British
propaganda as proof of the “monstrous” character of the German nation, providing a
framework for interpreting the war as a struggle between civilization and barbarism
(Horne & Kramer 2001: 296). The apocalyptic tone of British atrocity propaganda was
typified by Barry Pain’s poem “In the Trail of the Hun”: 
Villages burned down to dust;
Torture, murder, bestial lust,
Filth too foul for printers’ ink,
Crimes from which the apes would shrink (cited in Robb 2015: 124)
7 Moreover,  as  Pain’s  reference  to  “bestial  lust”  implies,  many  reports  of  German
“beastliness” concentrated on the enemy’s supposed sexual aggression and outrages
against  female  civilians  (Frost  2002:  20-2;  Gullace  1997).  After  the  destruction  of
Louvain  university  library  and  the  bombardment  of  Rheims  Cathedral,  The  Times
presented Kaiser Wilhelm II as “the modern Attila”, his troops as “ruthless barbarians”,
their crimes as “without a parallel even in the Dark Ages” and the war as the concern of
“every nation on the side of humanity and progress, all peoples who do not wish to see
Christian civilization submerged beneath a flood of barbarism.” (The Times, 29 August
1914 and 21 September 1914).  In 1915, the first large-scale use of poison gas at the
Second  Battle  of  Ypres,  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  aerial  attacks  on  the  British
mainland by German Zeppelins and the publication of the Bryce Report  on Alleged
German Outrages all further reinforced this image of German barbarity and disregard
for civilized norms (Schramm 2007: 384; Grayzel 2012: 55). These powerful images of
German  “beastliness”  and  atrocities  committed  against  women  and  children  by  a
“monstrous  Hun”  soon  overshadowed  Britain’s  original  war  aims  as  the  focus  of
wartime propaganda,  the  more abstract  causes  of  defending Belgian neutrality  and
honouring  treaty  commitments  giving  way  to  the  emotional  appeal  of  redressing
German atrocities and standing up to the “Prussian bully” (Buitenhuis 1987: 9-10; Pick
1993:  155).  When  combined  with  the  notion  that  Britain  and  her  allies  were  the
defenders of civilization and justice, the enemy image thus became inseparable from
the rationale for the war itself. 
8 This does not mean, however, that pre-existing, positive views of Germany, particularly
as  a  cultural  or  scientific  role-model,  were  abandoned  entirely  or  that  there  was
immediately universal approval in Britain for viewing all Germans as the enemy. Some
British  commentators  continued  to  insist  on  need  to  distinguish  between  “two
Germanies”: a militarist, expansionist Prussia on the one hand and a peaceful, civilized
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southern and western Germany on the other (Pulzer, 1996: 235-50). The Chancellor of
the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, declared in September 1914, for example, that “we
are not fighting the German people.  The German people are under the heel  of  this
military caste” (Kuropka 1984: 120). However, in response to reports of German war
enthusiasm  in  August  1914  and  to  German  attempts  to  defend  the  actions  of  the
German army in Belgium and France, such a distinction was downplayed. It was argued
instead that the whole of German society had been thoroughly “Prussianized” since
1871 (Muir  1914:  113;  Robbins  1999:  27).  When,  in  October  1914,  an appeal  “to  the
civilized  world”  was  published  by  93  German  scientists,  writers  and  academics,
defending German actions in Belgium and insisting that Germany would continue to
fight the war “as a civilized nation”, British propaganda simply found a new target: the
blood-thirsty German professor (see, for example, The Globe, 22 Oct. 1914). By 1916 The
Times was warning against the “dangerous fallacies” inherent in the notion of “two
Germanies”,  arguing  that  even  “such  great  strongholds  of  the  other,  non-military,
Germany as Hamburg, Cologne, and Frankfurt have been conspicuous in the German
Press  for  the  vehemence  of  their  war  spirit”  (The  Times,  27  Jan.  1916).  As  the  war
dragged on, the notion of “two Germanies” thus had ever-decreasing value for wartime
propaganda, despite not disappearing from British debates entirely. 
9 Following the abdication of the Kaiser and the signing of the Armistice in November
1918, the “two Germanies” idea suddenly became relevant once more, several British
observers  expressing  their  optimism  that  the  defeat  of  German  imperialism  and
Prussian  militarism  might  allow  the  “other”  peaceful  Germany  to  re-emerge.  The
former British officer George Young, for example, expressed his hope that, after the
downfall  of  “Kaiserism”,  the  German  Revolution  would  prove  “strong  enough  to
exorcise the evil genius of Prussianism and of Junkerism” (Young 1920: 10). Similarly,
the war correspondent Philip Gibbs, who was among the first to enter Germany with
the  British  occupying  forces  in  November  1918,  felt  hopeful  that  the  “death  of
militarism” would be “cleansing to the soul of Germany” and that “she will emerge
from  all  those  years  of  evil  cleaner  and  brighter  and  kinder”  (Gibbs  1921b:  202).
However, despite military surrender and the proclamation of the Republic, the enemy
image of the war years — that of a pointy-helmeted “Prussian Ogre” or “Beastly Hun”
capable of heinous acts of vandalism and cruelty against innocent women and children
—  did  not  disappear  when  the  armistice  was  signed.  In  Britain  an  atmosphere  of
recrimination prevailed:  calls  were made in the press  to  “make Germany pay” and
“hang the Kaiser”, and a Ministry of Information film with the catchphrase “once a
Hun, always a Hun” insisted that there should be no trading with Germany after the
war  (Sanders  & Taylor  1982:  162).  It  was  in  such an atmosphere  of  war-weariness,
recrimination, hope and uncertainty that British troops entered German territory as
occupiers in November 1918. 
 
“Unintelligibly friendly”: Encounters with German
Civilians, 1918-1930 
10 As a condition of the Armistice, the left bank of the Rhine was occupied by the armies
of Britain, France, Belgium and the United States. The British were allocated a zone of
occupation  centred  on  Cologne,  where  they  remained,  in  gradually  diminishing
numbers, until 1926, when they withdrew to a new, smaller zone around the city of
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Wiesbaden.  As  a  result,  even though British stereotypes of  the enemy were closely
bound  up  with  images  of  German  (or  Prussian)  militarism,  the  first  Germans
encountered  by  the  British  in  the  Rhineland  were  almost  exclusively  civilians,  all
military forces having been required to withdraw to fifty kilometres beyond the Rhine.
In the demilitarized Rhineland the most obvious visual  components of  the wartime
enemy image — spiked helmets and military uniforms — had all but disappeared from
the streets. As one press report on life in post-war Cologne put it: “The Soldier has
gone; the Civilian has come — to stay” (The Graphic, 14 June 1919). According to another
British  visitor  to  the  Rhineland,  “with  their  uniforms  off,  their  absurd  martial
arrogance put aside”, the Germans were revealed as “flesh and blood human beings”
(Nottingham  Journal,  1  March  1921).  Although  such  observations,  printed  in  British
newspapers  with  relatively  low circulation  figures,  may  not  have  counteracted  the
general mood of recrimination and Germanophobia in the British media at the end of
the war (Schramm 2007: 494-6), they nevertheless reveal the effect that face-to-face
encounters in the post-war Rhineland had on individual attitudes towards the wartime
enemy image. After four years of wartime propaganda, encounters with civilians often
proved, at the very least, surprising and disconcerting to the British when they crossed
the frontier into German territory.
11 In an account of the end of the war entitled Back to Life (1921), Philip Gibbs recalled his
astonishment to be told by a young German, in the first village across the frontier, that
“the war is over, and we can be friends again.” Already surprised by such an attitude
from the defeated enemy, Gibbs was even more amazed to find that the men of the
British  cavalry  patrol  “did  not  seem  to  be  nourishing  thoughts  of  hatred  and
vengeance” and quickly began chatting to German civilians in a friendly manner. “We
had been in the German village ten minutes”, recalled Gibbs: “There was no sign of
hatred  here,  on  one  side  or  the  other.  Already  something  had  happened  which  in
England, if they knew, would seem monstrous and incredible. A spell had been broken”
(Gibbs 1921: 146). According to Gibbs, face-to-face encounters quickly broke the spell of
wartime propaganda or, as he recalled one British officer reflecting, “hatred of a nation
breaks down in the presence of its individuals […] in spite of five years' education in
savagery." (Gibbs 1921: 158) As a result of such friendly encounters, Gibbs writes, the
gap  between  the  attitude  of  British  soldiers  and  civilians  in  Germany  and  public
opinion at home widened: “if  old men from St.  James's Street clubs in London, and
young women in the suburbs clamouring for the Kaiser's head, could be transported
straight  to  Cologne  without  previous  warning  of  the  things  they  would  see”,  he
declared, “they would go raving mad” (Gibbs 1921: 155). Gibbs reflected on the same
themes  in  The  Hope  of  Europe,  also  published  in  1921,  concluding  that  the  natural
friendliness of German-British encounters involved “a recognition that these people,
anyhow, were human souls,  not individually guilty of  atrocities,  not ‘Huns’  in their
manners and ideas, not particularly responsible for the war, and jolly glad, like our
people, that it was over at last” (Gibbs 1921b: 169). However, when he returned to the
same theme once again in his 1923 novel The Middle of the Road, his British protagonist
finds this realisation disconcerting, struggling to make sense of the fact that “within a
few days after the occupation of Cologne, British soldiers had clinked beer-mugs with
the fellows who had once lain behind machine-guns, mowing them down”. Faced with
the friendliness of the civilian population, this former soldier finds it “impossible to
keep up the  old  hate  against  them” yet  at  the  same time “reproached himself  for
having forgotten ‘the Enemy’ so completely that he could shake hands with a German
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(so  violating an ancient  vow)  without  any sense  of  repugnance”.  Thus,  in  both his
memoirs and this fictionalized account,  Gibbs recalled the psychological adjustment
the British had to make when re-considering their wartime image of the enemy. 
12 The  bewildering  friendliness  of  the  local  population,  often  met  with  incredulity,
resentment and suspicion on the part of the British occupiers, is a recurrent theme in
British accounts of the occupation. The military historian and MP Charles Oman, who
visited  Cologne  in  April  1919,  wrote  of  his  “overwhelming impression […]  that  the
Germans were astoundingly, and indeed unintelligibly friendly” (Oman 1933: 248). This
absence of  any signs  of  resentment  was,  according to  Oman,  “puzzling,  and rather
unpleasant” to the British, not least because they “all came to Germany with a very
strong  prejudice  against  the  Germans”  as  a  result  of  German  “outrages”  against
civilians during the war. “These were hard to forget”, continued Oman, “and it was
surprising to find that our involuntary hosts obviously expected us to be quite without
prejudice against them” (Oman 1933: 251). Such puzzlement at German attitudes was
compounded  by  the  feeling  that  British  civilians  would  not  have  responded  so
positively to the arrival of conquering German troops. B.T. Reynolds, a British officer
billeted in the home of a German widow in Benrath, was surprised by the friendliness of
the Germans he encountered: “I couldn’t help feeling, the whole time, that I should
have felt very different if the roles had been reversed and a German officer had been
billeted  in  my house”  (Reynolds  1933:  33-4).  Similarly,  the  English  painter  William
Rothenstein, attached to the Canadian Army as a war artist, was struck by how many
German civilians came to admire his canvas as he painted a British gun on the banks of
the Rhine: “had the Germans won and placed a gun on the Thames-side in London, and
a German painter been painting it, no Englishmen would have said, ‘How beautiful’”
(Rothenstein 1932:  357).  Canadian soldiers serving in the British Occupied Area felt
equally confused, finding that any desire for revenge against Germany “died away into
a sort of exasperated bewilderment” when they came into contact with “the mild and
docile  Hun”  (Macpherson  1920:  259).  In  a  letter  home,  the  Canadian  soldier  John
McKendrick Hughes recorded his surprise that a large crowd of German onlookers had
gathered  to  watch  the  arrival  of  a  Guard’s  Division  in  Cologne  in  January  1919,
apparently without any feelings of resentment, and wondered: “Would we do the same
if  the  Prussian  Guards  were  marching  through  Edmonton  or  London?  I  cannot
understand it” (Hughes 2005: 217). As the British journalist Ferdinand Tuohy put it “the
eternal  mystery of  the Boche attitude never ceased to be a fruitful  tea-table topic”
(Tuohy 1931: 221).
13 Such  difficulty  in  understanding  German  attitudes  stemmed  in  part  from  the  gap
between the expectations of the British and the reality they encountered. The Anglo-
Irish writer Katharine Tynan, who arrived in Cologne in 1923 with “an expectation of
enmity” (Tynan 1925: 59), was instead confronted with “that friendliness which is the
bewilderment of every English-speaking new-comer” (4). On the whole, she found the
lack of enmity between the British and Rhinelanders an agreeable surprise, but she
“never tired of wondering about the mind of the Rhinelander” (179) and assumed that,
below the surface, old hatreds still persisted (59). Tynan was also able, occasionally, to
identify individual Germans who conformed to her expectations of the enemy image,
recalling that in the hotel where she stayed “there were two of the waiters who looked
everything that propaganda had told us of the German. […] One could always see these
two ‘coming over’ through the smoke of the barrage” (6). The persistence of aspects of
the enemy image can also be seen in the account of the occupation years by Violet
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Markham, who lived in Cologne for over a year from March 1919 while her husband
was  Chief  Demobilization  Officer  for  the  Army  of  the  Rhine.  Markham  found  the
experience of the occupation beneficial insofar as it brought “the enemies of yesterday
in touch, and so help[ed] to break down a certain amount of prejudice.” (Markham
1921: 208) She felt  that “the wholesale indictment of a nation” was absurd because
“there are good Germans and bad Germans, Germans animated by a quite detestable
spirit,  others who are conscientious and high-minded.” (218) Despite such remarks,
Markham’s account nevertheless regularly condemns Prussia and the “evil  spirit let
loose by the Prussian theory of Life” (250-1), holds the Junkers responsible for the war
(106, 115, 215, 219) and reserves especially critical remarks for German professors, who
she claimed, were “notorious for their bloodthirstiness” (206-7). In Markham’s account,
the image of the Prussian enemy is never far away: she informs readers, for example,
that an old housekeeper whom she disliked “had the hall-mark of the Prussian on her”
(25).  Looking  back  on  the  experience  of  occupation  in  her  1953  autobiography,
Markham admitted that a memory of reports of German wartime atrocities had left her
“puzzled by the discrepancies between our personal impressions and a darker, more
sinister side of the German character”. She felt, however, that the negative image of the
enemy “only applied to a minority, certainly not the pleasant, friendly people among
whom we were living” (Markham 1953:  159).  Thus,  the friendly attitude of  German
civilians may have destabilized British images of the enemy, but it did not dispel them
completely.
14 One of Markham’s most perceptive remarks relates to the way in which the British in
the Rhineland tended to interpret German behaviour through the prism of their own
prejudices.  She  noted  that  “some  of  the  English  in  Cologne  ha[d]  arrived  at  fixed
judgments  about  Germany  before  setting  foot  in  the  country.  If  they  find  the
inhabitants civil they at once call them servile, if they show spirit they denounce them
as insolent” (Markham 1921: 209). A reviewer of Markham’s book recorded his own,
similar experiences of life in the Rhineland: “On first thoughts I imagined the people of
Cologne and the district to be disgustingly servile. Afterwards I suspected hypocrisy.
Thirdly, and finally, I came to the opinion that their nature, brutal or kindly, arises
from amazing docility towards authority, good or bad” (Nottingham Journal,  1 March
1921).  Similarly,  Ferdinand Tuohy considered German friendliness evidence of “that
undoubted streak of  servility  which lies  enfolded in the German character” (Tuohy
1931: 221), while an article in The Scotsman interpreted it as proof that the Germans
lacked any sense of shame and were “as arrogant and conceited as ever” (The Scotsman,
18 April 1919). Major Seabury Ashmead-Bartlett of the Royal Field Artillery put forward
an  equally  negative  interpretation  of  German  friendliness,  suggesting  that  “having
been beaten they are anxious to placate their conquerors, as is the way with bullies all
the  world  over”  (Ashmead-Bartlett  1921:  185).  In  other  words,  even  German
friendliness could confirm, in the eyes of the British, the negative stereotypes of the
enemy promulgated during the war. The fact that large crowds turned up to watch
British military ceremonies was attributed by some authors to a German fondness “for
pomp and goose-stepping” (Tuohy 1931: 218; see also Tynan 1925: 179). Only very rarely
did British interpretations of German friendliness recognize the reality: that polite co-
operation was also motivated by fear and by the hope that good relations with the
British might bring lighter sanctions (Van Emden 1996: 43).
15 In  his  attempt to  understand German attitudes,  Ashmead-Bartlett  also proposed an
alternative explanation for the friendliness of the Rhineland population, namely that
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“the Rheinländer are not real Germans, feel little, if any, attachment to the Prussian
system and are  decent  people  at  heart”  (Ashmead-Bartlett  1921:  185).  Reviving the
long-standing suppositions about “two Germanies”, this regional explanation for the
lack of enmity encountered in the Rhineland was regularly put forward by the British
(and even more so by the French) during the occupation. B.T. Reynolds, for example,
noted that the “whole outlook and mentality” of the Prussian was “very different from
that of the Rhinelander” (Reynolds 1933: 96),  while Robert Coulson, who spent four
years  in  the  occupied  Rhineland,  noted  that  the  Prussian,  known  for  his  “frosty
formality, his mentality, which was autocratic or subservient according to his position,
had  nothing  in  common  with  the  temperamental  freedom-loving  gaiety  of  the
Rhinelander”  (“Apex”  1931:  126).  Similarly,  the  former  army  officer  and  war
correspondent  for  the Daily  Telegraph Charles  à  Court  Repington reported from the
Rhineland that “there is nothing of the Prussian here. No stiff formalism, no bluster
and swagger, but the easy ways of would-be happy dwellers in their fruitful valleys”
(Repington 1922: 220). This supposed contrast between Rhinelanders and Prussians was
discussed at length by former British intelligence officer G.E.R. Gedye who published a
series of articles in The Bystander under the pen-name Eric Gordon while employed as a
secretary  to  the  Inter-Allied  Rhineland  High  Commission  (see  Wittek  2005:  110-6).
Though written in a light-hearted manner, his articles gave a damning account of the
Prussian enemy.  In March 1922,  for  instance,  Gedye warned that  the British,  while
living alongside “an easy-going friendly race” among picturesque vineyards and ruined
castles in the Rhineland, were likely to forget that “all Germans are not Rhinelanders”
and that the “real, square-headed Prussians east of the Elbe” were “narrow intolerance
personified” (The Bystander, 8 March 1922). The enemy image of wartime propaganda,
Gedye  argued,  did  not  apply  to  the  Rhinelander  since “the  typical  German,  as  we
imagine him, is really a typical Prussian” (The Bystander, 21 Jan. 1920). 
16 It  was not  only the British,  of  course,  who made such claims,  which were also put
forward  by  the  French  in  their  attempt  to  promote  separatist  movements  in  the
Rhineland (Nadler 1987), as well as by the mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, in the
hope that the Rhineland city might be spared the full brunt of British anti-Prussianism
(Williamson 1991: 19). The notion of Prussian (as opposed to German) responsibility for
the war was certainly a useful political argument in the Rhineland: in March 1919, The
Times reported on complaints from the population of Cologne that they were being
made to pay for the sins of “a few Prussians” (The Times, 12 March 1919). Whether such
claims were made by the British, by the French, or by the Rhinelanders themselves,
however,  they  did  not  dismantle  the  enemy  image  entirely,  but  simply  shifted  it
geographically  eastwards,  beyond  the  frontiers  of  the  British  occupied  area.  Thus,
while  many  British  commentators  could  not  help  but  acknowledge  that  their
experience in the Rhineland rarely corresponded to their expectations of the German
enemy,  their  explanations for  this  discrepancy frequently  fell  back on pre-existing,
negative stereotypes regarding Prussia and Prussian militarism. This tendency can also
be observed in unpublished military memoirs of the occupation. One British officer,
when surprised by the co-operative attitude of the Rhineland population, concluded
that “maybe the Rhinelanders are different to those further East and the Prussians”,
rather than abandoning his wartime image of the enemy completely (IWM 6827: 27-28).
Another  officer,  struck by  the  beauty  of  German classical  music  during his  stay  in
Cologne, did not let this experience dispel his view of the “real nature” of the Prussian
militarist  enemy:  “how  different,  I  thought,  from  the  real  nature  of  the  German
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warlords”  (IWM  1467:  66).  Some  British  visitors,  meanwhile,  simply  refused  to
recognize  any  such  division  between  “two  Germanies”,  emphasizing  instead  the
continuing loyalty of the Rhinelanders to the “Prussian spirit” (Butler, 1921: 300), or to
the “Junker element of East Prussia” and the “pernicious doctrines of the Professor
class” (Bacon 1921: 225-6). 
 
“An Army of Gentlemen”: The British Occupiers in a
German Mirror 
17 Several British accounts attributed the good relations between the occupiers and the
occupied not to any specific traits of the German character, but to what Sir Douglas
Haig referred to, when praising the conduct of British troops in Cologne in his final
despatch, as the “inborn courtesy and good temper of the British soldier” (Haig 1919:
319). Violet Markham, for example, claimed that good relations and the lack of German
animosity towards the British occupiers was evidence of “the half-unconscious genius
of  our  race  for  government”  (Storer  2010:  69).  There  was,  in  other  words,  a  clear
tendency among British observers in the Rhineland to attribute the benevolent, orderly
conduct of the occupiers to inherent “British” national characteristics.  Implicitly or
explicitly, this self-image was constructed in opposition to the image of the German
enemy. Thus, even though the wartime enemy image was a less overt presence during
the  Rhineland  occupation,  it  was  nevertheless  implicit  in  the  British  tendency  to
measure their own conduct against the behaviour,  real or imagined, of the German
enemy. 
18 The symbolic  importance attached to the supposedly irreproachable conduct of  the
British as occupiers could be interpreted as an attempt to compensate for the fact that,
during the war itself,  Allied claims to moral  superiority had hardly been clear cut.
Although the British public had been outraged by the German uses of chlorine gas,
aerial bombardment against civilians and unrestricted submarine warfare, Britain had
quickly followed suit in the case of the first two, while the third was partly a response
to the equally morally problematic British naval blockade that sought to starve German
civilians  into  submission.  Condemnation  of  Britain’s  supposed  ruthlessness  in
maintaining  the  anti-German  “hunger-blockade”  had  played  a  prominent  part  in
German wartime propaganda, alongside criticisms of Britain’s colonial expansionism
and violence against subject peoples including the Boers and the Irish (Stibbe 2001).
The conduct of  British troops in the Rhineland therefore had a particular symbolic
importance when it came to restoring Britain’s standing in Germany. Given that British
wartime propaganda had emphasised German “frightfulness” towards the populations
of  conquered  neighbouring  territories,  and  Britain  had  never  occupied  German
territory during the war, the Rhineland occupation was an opportunity to demonstrate
the supposed moral superiority of the Allies over their wartime enemies.  At a time
when, from Ireland to India, British violence against civilians was being condemned as
“Prussianism”,  it  was  also  an  opportunity  for  the  British  to  defend  their  national
reputation in the face of accusations of hypocrisy and double-standards (Pick 1993: 150;
Lawrence 2003: 572; Sayer 1991). 
19 Even before the occupation began, the contrast between German and Allied behaviour
had been anticipated in the British press. The Times, for example, proclaimed in 1914
that, unlike the Germans in France, “the Allies have clean hands, and when in turn they
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march through Germany they will keep them clean” (The Times, 21 Sept. 1914). After
British troops entered Germany, accounts of their conduct regularly made comparisons
with a stereotyped image of German militarism. Noting the “remarkable tact” displayed
by British occupiers in 1919, The Times claimed that there was “nothing overbearing”
in  British  behaviour  and contrasted  the  iron discipline  of  Prussian militarism with
“British”  traditions  of  good  sportsmanship  when  describing  British  troops  playing
football “on a parade ground which but a short while ago was devoted to the cult of the
goose step” (The Times, 6 May 1919). Another article, recalling an alleged contrast in
the  conduct  of  British  and  German  soldiers  during  the  Napoleonic  wars  a  century
previously, called upon the British army to maintain its “great tradition” of “admirable
discipline” and “humane and soldierly conduct”, which stood in marked contrast to
“the systematic and savage brutality of the German troops”. British occupation, the
same article concluded, would teach the Germans a lesson “in the treatment of civilians
by the occupying soldiers of a just but generous democracy” (The Times, 9 Dec. 1918).
Like  several  other  British  commentators,  this  journalist  even  suggested  that  the
German population had grown to prefer the rule of the British enemy to the iron rule of
Prussian militarism before 1918 (Jeffery 2005: 456).
20 While  comparisons  were  frequently  made  with the  nature  and  conduct  of  German
militarism in the past, it was even more common in British discussion of the Rhineland
to contrast British behaviour with the imagined conduct of the enemy, had the Central
Powers been victorious. In order to understand the fundamental differences between
the British and the Germans, Ferdinand Tuohy argued, “one had but to conjure in the
mind’s  eye  (and  Britons  on  the  Rhine  seldom  tired  of  it)  Prussian  conquerors
swaggering through London” (Tuohy 1931: 221). Violet Markham, similarly, felt that “if
the war had come to a different end, we should have felt the full weight of the Prussian
jackboot. The Boche as a conqueror can be intolerable — swollen-headed, swaggering,
brutal” (Markham 1921: 67). An English teacher who had lived in Cologne before the
war, Alexander Meff, arrived at the same conclusion, praising the British for behaving
with  “no  swagger,  no  arrogance,  no  Vae  Victis  insolence.  If  one  can  imagine  the
unthinkable and suppose a German army holding London, what insufferable arrogance
we should have had to endure!” (The Graphic, 14 June 1919). Even the strained relations
between the wives of British officers and their German hosts were compared favourably
to  the  equivalent  situation  in  the  case  of  a  German  victory:  “Conjure  conquering
Hausfraus as dictatresses in English halls and kitchens (no, it was never as bad as that
might  have  been!”)  (Tuohy  1931:  225).  Similarly,  when  commenting  on  the  British
treatment of German prisoners of war, G.E.R. Gedye wrote that “we can hardly imagine
Germans treating our prisoners in the same spirit, any more than we can imagine them
occupying the East  Coast  in  the easy,  if  rather  contemptuous manner which is  the
keynote  here”.  Like  so  many  other  British  commentators,  Gedye  attributed  this
contrast to supposed differences in national character: “we are not Germans, and it is
not in the British nature to vent on a number of luckless individuals whom fate has left
defenceless, the indignation felt against the nation as a whole”. Ironically, in the light
of such sweeping statements, Gedye also claimed in the same article that an ability to
make  a  distinction  between  “the  enemy”  as  an  abstract  concept  and  “individual
members of that enemy” was in itself a “truly British characteristic” (The Bystander, 20
August 1919). 
21 Almost inevitably, the actual behaviour of British troops did not always live up to the
high standards of this national self-image. In fact,  the British representative on the
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Armistice  Commission,  General  Haking,  had  already  warned  Field  Marshal  Haig  in
December 1918 that “we cannot expect that our troops will necessarily behave better in
Germany than the Germans did in Belgium and France” (Williamson,  1991:  17).  Yet
when British troops behaved poorly during the occupation, they were criticized for not
living up to expectations. Neville Stephen Lytton, a British officer and grandson of the
writer and politician Edward Bulwer Lytton, wrote that the impression made by the
British  on  the  inhabitants  of  Cologne  in  the  first  few  days  of  occupation  was
“shockingly bad”, listing among its faults open fraternization, public drunkenness and
a  “general  impression  of  vacillation  that  created  the  worst  possible  effect  on  the
German mind”. Lytton saw this as all the more regrettable for the fact that style and
decorum were  so  crucial  to  the  British  self-image:  “The  average  German”,  claimed
Lytton, “knows that he is more industrious and a more thorough organizer than we are,
but he does believe or did believe that we had more style and were gentlemen; I am
afraid that on this occasion we must have shattered his last ideal about us” (Lytton,
1921: 217-8). National stereotypes of the Germans, including in this case some positive
ones, formed a constant point of reference in discussions of British conduct.
22 Despite occasional criticisms, most accounts of the British army on the Rhine agreed
that the excellent discipline and irreproachable conduct of the British had made a more
positive impression on the German population than any of the other Allied armies (The
Times, 19 Dec. 1919) and that the British zone around Cologne was as a haven of peace
and goodwill in comparison to the neighbouring French zone (The Times, 30 Nov. 1923).
The French were often presented as treating their defeated enemy more harshly than
the British, motivated by age-old hatreds that far surpassed those of even the most
Germanophobe British occupier. Violet Markham argued, for example, that “it cannot
be expected that France with the memories of 1870 and 1914 burnt deep into her very
marrow  […]  can  approach  the  tasks  of  occupation  in  the  same  spirit  as  the  more
detached  Britons  who  have  less  to  forget”  (Markham  1921:  28).  Katharine  Tynan,
similarly,  noted that  the  French were  “good haters  and they  had reasons  to  hate”
(Tynan 1925: 121). Other British visitors attributed French attitudes to certain national
characteristics  as  well  as  to  past  experiences,  Frank  Hedges  Butler,  for  example,
declaring that although “Frenchmen of course have cause for their bitterness […] the
British  temperament  is  different  to  that  of  our  Gallic  friends”  (Butler  1920:  300).
However strong the rivalry and antagonism between Britain and Germany had been
before the First World War, there was certainly nothing in the British case that could
compare  with  the  construction  of  the  myth  of  “hereditary  enemies”,  that  had
characterized French-German relations since 1870 (Jeismann 1991; Nolan 2004).
23 As well as marking the high point of tension between the French and the Germans, the
Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr from 1923 to 1925 also exposed the differences
of opinion between the British and their wartime allies. While the British government
adopted  an  ambiguous  policy  of  neutrality,  the  British  press  (with  the  significant
exception of Lord Northcliffe’s Daily Mail) tended to take a sympathetic view of the
Germans  at  this  time,  presenting  the  population  of  the  Ruhr  as  victims  of  French
aggression  (Wittek  2005:  272-277).  In  this  context,  Robert  Coulson  claimed,  many
British  occupiers  and  observers  on  the  Rhine  not  only  tended  to  feel  sympathetic
towards the Germans but even came to believe that  the French “had become their
enemies”  (“Apex”  1931:  18).  Henry  Nevinson,  sent  to  the  Ruhr  to  report  for  the
Manchester Guardian, was a harsh critic of France’s policy arguing that “the resolve of
France to trample her enemy in the dust” would only increase German hatred and sow
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the seeds of a future war, while claiming that “nearly all English people […] naturally
sympathise[d] with those who are down and are still  being kicked though they are
down” (Manchester Guardian, 3 Dec. 1923). In spite of what he saw as Britain’s culpable
neutrality, Nevinson thus attributed Britain’s unwillingness to join with the French as
evidence  of  “British”  benevolence  and  fair-mindedness,  and  also  noted  with  some
satisfaction,  in  his  autobiographical  account  of  the  period that  the  British army in
Cologne “upheld its  fine reputation for justice,  good-nature,  and decent behaviour”
(Nevinson 1928: 292). The initial French invasion of the Ruhr led many Germans to look
upon the British “as protectors, if not as friends” (Tuohy 1931: 230) and, as Katharine
Tynan noted, “the British Occupation must have had its best chance of being popular in
the fact that it was side by side with the French” (Tynan 1925: 121). However, British
inaction soon became the target of German resentment, reviving well-worn clichés of
Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy, “perfidious Albion” or Britain as a “false friend” (“Apex” 1931:
60;  The Times,  29 Dec.  1924).  Such criticisms,  and British sensitivity towards them,
perhaps only go to illustrate how differently from the French the British were expected
to behave towards their defeated enemies.
24 When the last British troops began to withdraw from the Rhineland in the final months
of 1929, accounts in the British press emphasized the positive impression made by the
British occupiers on the Germans. In such reports, the stereotypical British self-image
and  an  implicit  comparison  with  the  French  were  a  constant  presence.  Ferdinand
Tuohy,  for  instance,  praised  the  British  for  being  “so  tactful  and  unassertive  in
handling Jerry” during what he described as “a very gentlemanly occupation” (The
Graphic,  24  Aug.  1929).  Reporting  from  Wiesbaden  in  December  1929,  The  Times
claimed  that  “the  British  troops  [left]  with  the  townspeople  a  high  reputation  for
justice, fair-dealing and politeness” (The Times, 13 Dec. 1929), while the Manchester
Guardian drew attention to  the tributes  paid by the Berlin press  to  the British for
leaving “not as enemies” and in a “gentlemanly fashion” (Manchester Guardian,  18
Sept. 1929). The Germans, British readers were informed, had come to appreciate the
fact that “the meaning of British military justice was fair play to all”, while the British
“army of gentlemen” was able to return home “leaving nothing but peace and good will
behind it”  (The  Times,  23  Dec.  1929).  Such statements  reflected  the  official  British
interpretation of a decade of occupation. When Tom Shaw, the Secretary of State for
War  in  Ramsay  MacDonald’s  Labour  government,  wrote  to  congratulate  General
William  Thwaites,  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  British  Army  of the  Rhine,  for  the
exemplary  way  his  troops  had  conducted  themselves,  he  insisted  that  they  had
successfully “maintained the British reputation for chivalry, courtesy and fair play”, a
statement  widely  reprinted  in  the  British  press  including  in  The  Times  and  The
Manchester  Guardian  on  14  September  1929.  This  constant  emphasis  on  “British”
characteristics, as well as the implication that the German population had been taught
some kind of lesson through their encounter with the British, once again reinforced the
notion that the attitude of the enemy, in the case of a German victory, would have been
strikingly different.
25 In general, there can be little doubt that personal encounters between British occupiers
and German civilians during the Rhineland occupation had a positive effect in breaking
down wartime enemy images. Looking back on the Rhineland occupation in the early
1930s, B.T. Reynolds reflected that “the British soldier is a lovable soul and I really
think that  the presence of  British troops on German soil  went a  long way towards
reducing the ill  effects of  war-time propaganda on both sides” (Reynolds 1933:  51).
Meeting the Enemy
Angles, 10 | 2020
13
Certainly,  face-to-face  encounters  with  individual  Germans  exposed  the  British
occupiers to a far more nuanced picture of German society than wartime propaganda
had permitted. Nevertheless, images of the German enemy promulgated during the war
— relating both to Prussian militarism in particular and the German national character
more broadly — were able to endure in the context of the occupation, albeit in more
subtle ways. Indeed, British commentators even found it necessary to fall back on these
stereotypes when trying to explain the friendly attitude of the local population towards
their  British  occupiers.  Moreover,  the  British  self-image  in  the  Rhineland  was
frequently constructed in opposition to a real or imagined German counterpart. Thus,
while face-to-face encounters during the years of post-war occupation on the Rhine
helped make British attitudes towards Germany at least as nuanced and multifaceted as
they had been before 1914, long-standing stereotypes of the German enemy were not
entirely dispelled, even in the minds of many of those who experienced the occupation
first hand. Given how closely the image of Prussian militarism, the “Beastly Hun” and
the  bloodthirsty  German  professor  became  bound  up  with  British  war  aims  and
justifications  for  sacrifice,  it  was  difficult  to  abandon such images  entirely  without
calling  into  question  both  the  meaning  of  war  and  the  harshness  of  the  post-war
treaties,  of  which  the  very  presence  of  British  troops  on  the  Rhine  was  a  direct
consequence.  When  war  broke  out  again  in  1939,  remarkably  similar  national
stereotypes, similarly bound up with images of Prussian militarism, would be mobilized
once again in British propaganda, and even went on to shape Britain’s policy towards
Germany during its second experience of post-war occupation after 1945 (Cooper 1998;
Kettenacker 1984). 
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When British soldiers and civilians entered the Allied-occupied Rhineland after the First World
War, they were often surprised to discover that the individual Germans they encountered had
little in common with the image of the enemy promulgated by British propaganda during the
war.  While  face-to-face encounters  with an often disconcertingly friendly civilian population
inevitably forced the British to re-evaluate their wartime visions of the enemy, certain negative
stereotypes  of  the  German  enemy  nevertheless  persisted  in  the  context  of  the  occupation.
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Several British commentators even found it necessary to fall back on these stereotypes when
trying to explain the friendly attitude of the local population. To some, German friendliness only
served to demonstrate the servile disposition of the Germans towards any form of authority; to
others, it confirmed the existence of a supposed division in Germany between a liberal, peace-
loving  and  civilized  south  and  west  and  the  “real”  enemy,  an  autocratic, militarist  and
expansionist  Prussia.  Moreover,  the  British  self-image  in  the  Rhineland  was  frequently
constructed in opposition to a real or imagined German enemy. The attitude and behaviour of
the  occupiers  was  regularly  presented  as  characteristically  “British”  and measured  not  only
against how the Germans had treated the populations of occupied regions of France and Belgium
during the war, but also against how the stereotypical “Hun” would have behaved in the case of a
German victory. 
Lorsque soldats et civils britanniques sont entrés en Rhénanie occupée après la Première Guerre
mondiale, ils ont souvent été surpris de découvrir que les Allemands rencontrés avaient peu en
commun avec l’image de l’ennemi véhiculée par la propagande britannique pendant la guerre. Si
les  rencontres  individuelles  avec  la  population  civile,  souvent  surprenante  par  son
comportement amical, ont poussé les Britanniques à réévaluer leurs visions de l'ennemi, certains
stéréotypes  négatifs  de  l'ennemi  allemand  ont  néanmoins  persisté  pendant  l'occupation.  Ils
permirent parfois, aux yeux de certains témoins britanniques d’expliquer l’attitude amicale de la
population  locale.  Pour  certains,  la  gentillesse  de  la  population  Rhénane  ne  servait  qu'à
démontrer  la  disposition  servile  des  Allemands  à  l'égard  de  toute  forme  d’autorité ;  pour
d'autres, elle confirmait l'existence d'une prétendue division en Allemagne entre un sud-ouest
libéral,  pacifique  et  civilisé,  et  le  « véritable »  ennemi :  la  Prusse  autocratique,  militariste  et
expansionniste. De plus, l'image que l’occupant britannique en Rhénanie avait de lui-même fut
fréquemment construite en opposition avec un ennemi allemand réel ou imaginé. L'attitude et le
comportement  des  occupants  furent  régulièrement  présentés  comme
« typiquement britanniques » et opposés non seulement au comportement des Allemands envers
les civils français et belges pendant la guerre, mais aussi à la manière dont la figure stéréotypée
du « Boche » (« Hun ») se serait comportée dans l’hypothèse d'une victoire allemande.
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